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‘Demos	  before	  Democracy:	  Ideas	  of	  Nation	  and	  Society	  in	  Adam	  Smith’	  	  
Forthcoming	  in	  the	  Journal	  of	  Classical	  Sociology	  (vol.	  6,	  no.	  2,	  2016)	  
Jonathan	  Hearn,	  University	  of	  Edinburgh	  
	  
Introduction	  
What	  does	  Adam	  Smith	  mean	  by	  ‘nations’	  in	  his	  famous	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Nature	  
and	  Causes	  of	  the	  Wealth	  of	  Nations	  (1981[1776],	  cf.	  Hont	  2005:	  123-­‐5)?	  	  This	  is	  the	  initial	  question	  that	  provoked	  this	  article.	  	  More	  broadly	  however,	  the	  question	  is,	  what	  can	  an	  examination	  of	  Smith’s	  ideas	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  modern	  idea	  of	  the	  nation,	  particularly	  in	  its	  capitalist,	  liberal	  and	  democratic	  form?	  	  This	  inquiry	  speaks	  to	  contemporary	  debates	  in	  the	  study	  of	  nationalism,	  about	  the	  nature	  and	  origins	  of	  modern	  nationalism.	  	  When	  and	  how	  did	  it	  emerge?	  	  It	  also	  supports	  the	  case	  for	  seeing	  Smith	  as	  a	  classical	  sociologist,	  by	  arguing	  that	  encompassing	  his	  theories	  of	  morality	  and	  economy	  is	  a	  conception	  of	  human	  social	  relations	  that	  has	  implications	  for	  how	  we	  conceive	  of	  society	  more	  generally,	  including	  its	  national	  forms.	  	  In	  short,	  I	  argue	  that	  Smith,	  especially	  through	  his	  idea	  that	  social	  order	  can	  be	  generated	  relatively	  spontaneously	  through	  everyday	  interaction,	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  laying	  important	  groundwork	  for	  our	  modern	  conception	  of	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  people	  with	  a	  collective	  capacity	  for	  self-­‐government	  and	  rule,	  even	  while	  his	  ideas	  fall	  short	  of	  what	  we	  would	  now	  call	  ‘democracy’.	  	  
The	  argument	  proceeds	  by	  first	  examining	  current	  debates	  over	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  nation	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  history	  of	  nationalism.	  	  	  The	  diverse	  senses	  attached	  to	  the	  term	  nation	  today	  reflect	  its	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formation	  as	  an	  indeterminate	  response	  to	  a	  general	  crisis	  of	  moral	  and	  political	  authority	  that	  came	  to	  a	  head	  in	  the	  American	  and	  French	  Revolutions.	  	  	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  article	  turns	  to	  Smith’s	  writings,	  arguing	  that	  these	  illustrate	  the	  general	  state	  of	  disruption	  of,	  and	  uncertainty	  about,	  authority	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  they	  follow	  fairly	  conventional	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  nation,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  Smith’s	  theories	  of	  human	  nature	  and	  sociability	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  laying	  groundwork	  for	  evolving	  liberal	  conceptions	  of	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  society	  of	  self-­‐governing	  people.	  	  While	  Smith	  did	  not	  envision	  modern	  forms	  of	  democratic	  rule,	  his	  ideas	  provided	  support	  for	  those	  who	  eventually	  did,	  by	  arguing	  the	  widespread	  human	  capacity	  to	  regulate	  social	  behaviour	  without	  a	  strong	  centralized	  authority.	  
	  
The	  concept	  of	  the	  nation	  now,	  and	  then:	  
The	  concept	  of	  the	  ‘nation’	  in	  current	  theories	  of	  nationalism	  is	  polysemic	  and	  debated,	  and	  this	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  academic	  disagreement	  about	  conceptualisation.	  	  It	  is	  because	  multiple	  meanings	  are	  built	  into	  the	  concept	  from	  its	  modern	  origins,	  particularly	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century.	  	  Current	  disputes	  about	  whether	  to	  associate	  the	  term	  more	  with	  ethnicity	  or	  citizenship,	  culture	  or	  the	  state,	  are	  telling	  us	  something	  about	  the	  modern	  term	  and	  the	  historical	  context	  in	  which	  it	  took	  shape.	  	  Disagreements	  and	  ambiguities	  about	  how	  to	  conceptualise	  the	  nation	  occur	  along	  several	  lines.	  	  First,	  there	  are	  those	  who	  conceive	  of	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  historically	  deep	  form	  of	  identity,	  versus	  those	  who	  insist	  that	  it	  is	  a	  relatively	  recent,	  modern	  ideology.	  	  	  Steven	  Grosby	  sees	  it	  as	  a	  ‘territorial	  community	  of	  nativity’	  (2005:	  7),	  a	  social	  form	  that	  can	  be	  traced	  back	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to	  various	  premodern	  instances	  such	  as	  ancient	  Israel.	  	  Anthony	  Smith’s	  (2004)	  ‘ethnosymbolic’	  approach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  nationalism	  argues	  that	  modern	  nations	  normally	  have	  their	  roots	  in	  much	  longer	  standing	  communities	  of	  shared	  culture,	  territory	  and	  identity	  that	  he	  calls	  ‘ethnies’.	  	  On	  the	  ‘modernist’	  side	  of	  the	  argument,	  figures	  such	  as	  Ernest	  Gellner	  (1983)	  argue	  that	  nations	  are	  entirely	  modern	  formations	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  need	  for	  mobile	  and	  culturally	  integrated	  populations	  in	  industrial	  economies.	  	  John	  Breuilly	  (1996)	  places	  more	  emphasis	  on	  the	  modern	  state,	  and	  the	  dissolution	  of	  older	  corporate	  forms	  of	  identity,	  replaced	  by	  modern	  forms	  of	  national	  identity	  and	  civil	  society.	  	  As	  this	  already	  suggests,	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  conceive	  of	  nations	  as	  falling	  into	  two	  master	  types,	  ‘ethnic’	  forms	  grounded	  in	  notions	  of	  culture,	  and	  ‘civic’	  forms	  grounded	  in	  notions	  of	  citizenship	  (Brubaker	  1992;	  Kohn	  1967;	  Plamenatz	  1976).	  	  One	  extreme	  expression	  of	  this	  tendency	  is	  a	  strict	  opposition	  between	  ‘nationalism’	  and	  ‘patriotism’.	  	  Thus	  Walker	  Connor	  insists	  that	  the	  nation	  ‘is	  a	  group	  of	  people	  who	  feel	  that	  they	  are	  ancestrally	  related’	  (1994:	  202)	  and	  nationalism	  is	  a	  manifestation	  of	  this	  feeling,	  which	  must	  be	  strictly	  distinguished	  from	  ‘patriotism’	  as	  allegiance	  to	  the	  state.	  	  Writing	  in	  a	  more	  normative	  vein	  and	  drawing	  on	  the	  tradition	  of	  Machiavellian	  republicanism,	  Maurizio	  Viroli	  (1995)	  also	  makes	  a	  sharp	  separation	  here:	  
	   The	  language	  of	  patriotism	  has	  been	  used	  over	  the	  centuries	  to	  strengthen	  or	  invoke	  love	  of	  the	  political	  institutions	  and	  the	  way	  of	  life	  that	  sustain	  the	  common	  liberty	  of	  a	  people,	  that	  is	  love	  of	  the	  republic;	  the	  language	  of	  nationalism	  was	  forged	  in	  late	  eighteenth-­‐century	  Europe	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to	  defend	  or	  reinforce	  the	  cultural,	  linguistic,	  and	  ethnic	  oneness	  and	  homogeneity	  of	  a	  people	  (1995:	  1).	  	  While	  most	  commentators,	  myself	  included,	  would	  recognise	  the	  distinction	  being	  made	  here,	  it	  is	  doubtful	  whether	  it	  can	  be	  rigorously	  maintained	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  complex	  historical	  reality.	  	  It	  is	  the	  very	  messy	  multivalence	  of	  the	  ideas	  of	  nations	  and	  nationalism	  that	  we	  need	  to	  understand,	  without	  artificially	  cleaning	  things	  up.	  	  
I	  argue	  that	  the	  modern	  concept	  of	  the	  nation	  is	  best	  characterised	  not	  by	  ethnic	  and	  cultural	  narrowness,	  or	  intensity	  of	  civic	  commitment,	  but	  by	  striking	  indeterminacy	  or	  openness	  in	  regard	  to	  content.	  	  	  In	  recent	  work	  both	  Jack	  Snyder	  (2000:	  24,	  passim)	  and	  Michael	  Mann	  (2005:	  55-­‐69)	  have	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  the	  ambiguity	  between	  ‘ethnos’	  and	  ‘demos’	  that	  helps	  us	  account	  for	  the	  dynamics	  of	  nationalism.	  	  While	  the	  means	  of	  defining	  the	  social	  group	  fundamentally	  differs,	  ethnic	  commonality	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  versus	  political	  membership	  on	  the	  other,	  both	  can	  and	  have	  provided	  bases	  for	  mobilising	  support	  for	  nationalist	  projects.	  	  And	  many	  cases	  actually	  show	  complex	  struggles	  between	  these	  tendencies.	  	  I	  follow	  Mann	  (2005:	  3-­‐4)	  in	  using	  ‘demos’	  to	  signal	  not	  so	  much	  the	  long	  tradition	  of	  republican	  thought	  that	  Viroli	  invokes,	  but	  rather	  the	  general	  idea	  that	  comes	  into	  it	  own	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  that	  ‘the	  people’	  should	  be	  self-­‐governing	  and	  the	  ultimate	  source	  of	  the	  polity’s	  legitimacy.	  	  Mann	  and	  Snyder	  emphasise	  that	  this	  leaves	  unanswered:	  who	  are	  the	  people,	  and	  how	  should	  they	  rule	  themselves?	  	  ‘Ethnos’,	  that	  is	  a	  tightly	  culturally	  defined	  unit,	  is	  one	  answer	  to	  this	  question,	  but	  not	  the	  only	  one.	  	  As	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Michael	  Freeden	  (1998)	  has	  observed,	  one	  of	  the	  key	  traits	  of	  nationalism	  is	  its	  ideological	  promiscuity,	  linking	  variously	  with	  political	  ideologies	  (e.g.	  liberalism,	  socialism,	  fascism)	  and	  cultural	  traditions	  (e.g.	  religious,	  linguistic),	  which	  ‘fill	  in’	  the	  content	  according	  to	  particular	  historical	  contexts,	  helping	  to	  answer	  the	  questions	  just	  posed.	  	  Thinking	  about	  it	  this	  way	  also	  helps	  us	  to	  comprehend	  the	  political	  workings	  of	  liberal-­‐democratic	  forms	  of	  nation-­‐state.	  	  The	  tolerance	  of	  ideological	  and	  cultural	  diversity,	  and	  institutionalisation	  of	  democratic	  procedures,	  enable	  and	  regulate	  the	  relatively	  open	  and	  perennially	  disputed	  nation.	  	  The	  democratic	  political	  process	  becomes,	  in	  effect,	  a	  routinised	  debate	  over	  ‘who	  the	  people	  are’,	  with	  political	  parties	  and	  factions	  making	  opposing	  bids	  to	  define	  the	  people	  in	  terms	  of	  left	  versus	  right,	  progressive	  versus	  conservative,	  secular	  versus	  religious,	  and	  so	  on.	  
This	  peculiar,	  open-­‐ended	  form	  of	  the	  modern	  demos	  as	  just	  defined	  has	  particular	  origins	  in	  eighteenth	  century	  Europe	  and	  the	  trans-­‐Atlantic	  societies	  generated	  by	  imperialism.	  	  	  Particularly	  in	  Britain	  and	  France,	  the	  European	  superpowers	  of	  the	  day,	  there	  was	  an	  extensive	  ‘crisis	  of	  authority’,	  going	  on	  (Colley	  1992:	  147-­‐55;	  Dupré	  2004:	  112-­‐52).	  	  ‘Crisis’	  is	  and	  overused	  and	  overburdened	  word,	  and	  ‘widespread	  destabilisation’	  or	  ‘ongoing	  reconfiguration	  of	  authority’	  might	  be	  more	  precise.	  	  The	  key	  point	  is	  that	  this	  is	  the	  century	  on	  which	  the	  shift	  from	  the	  authority	  of	  ‘kings	  to	  people’	  pivots	  (Bendix	  1978).	  	  The	  Reformation	  had	  already	  weakened	  and	  fragmented	  centralised	  religious	  authority,	  generating	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  churches	  and	  sects	  claiming	  divine	  authority.	  	  The	  growing	  strength	  of	  commercial	  classes	  challenged	  more	  traditional	  landed	  forms	  of	  aristocratic	  authority,	  creating	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struggles	  for	  power	  and	  influence	  between	  the	  crown,	  aristocrats,	  merchants,	  the	  court	  and	  the	  commons.	  	  The	  de	  facto	  autonomy	  and	  self-­‐governance	  of	  far	  flung	  colonial	  populations	  further	  problematised	  the	  validity	  of	  power	  at	  the	  centre,	  whether	  of	  the	  monarch	  or	  of	  parliament.	  	  	  And	  the	  rise	  of	  ‘public	  opinion’	  	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  new	  kinds	  of	  intellectuals	  further	  destablised	  established	  forms	  of	  authority	  (Habermas	  1974;	  La	  Volpa	  1992;	  Wuthnow	  1989:	  180-­‐227).	  	  In	  the	  British	  context	  this	  process	  became	  manifest	  in	  debates	  between	  different	  factions	  within	  the	  aristocracy,	  and	  the	  circles	  of	  literati	  that	  revolved	  around	  them.	  	  The	  ‘Court’	  party,	  consisting	  of	  Whigs	  allied	  with	  the	  ruling	  party	  and	  the	  first	  prime	  minister	  Robert	  Walpole	  (1721-­‐42),	  stood	  for	  modernisation,	  commerce,	  the	  extension	  of	  court	  patronage,	  and	  public	  spending	  to	  support	  imperial	  expansion	  and	  war.	  	  The	  ‘Country’	  party	  represented	  Old	  Whigs	  and	  Tories	  allied	  with	  landed	  aristocracy	  and	  committed	  to	  a	  tradition	  of	  civic	  humanist	  thought,	  revolving	  particularly	  around	  the	  figure	  of	  Viscount	  Bolingbroke.	  	  This	  group	  drew	  on	  traditions	  of	  republican	  thought	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  revival	  of	  elite	  virtue	  in	  the	  face	  of	  political	  and	  commercial	  corruption	  (Gallagher	  1998:	  5-­‐14;	  Pocock	  2003:	  462-­‐7;	  Winch	  1978:	  28-­‐45).	  	  The	  picture	  of	  an	  intra-­‐aristocratic	  ideological	  conflict	  is	  of	  course	  complicated	  by	  intermarriage	  among	  rising	  mercantile	  elites	  and	  established	  aristocratic	  families,	  and	  the	  voices	  of	  less	  clearly	  aligned	  intellectuals.	  	  Nonetheless,	  the	  general	  uncertainty	  about	  how	  to	  anchor	  authority	  in	  this	  period	  is	  particularly	  evident	  in	  this	  partial	  polarisation	  of	  political	  opinion.	  	  
	   7	  
At	  the	  same	  time	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  political	  authority	  and	  where	  it	  lies	  was	  under	  debate,	  a	  new,	  proto-­‐social	  scientific	  conception	  of	  human	  social	  relations	  was	  taking	  shape,	  particularly	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  Scottish	  Enlightenment	  thinkers	  such	  as	  David	  Hume	  and	  Adam	  Smith.	  	  	  Fusing	  traditions	  of	  natural	  jurisprudence	  that	  sought	  to	  base	  notions	  of	  rights	  on	  conceptions	  of	  human	  nature,	  with	  a	  more	  empirical,	  natural	  scientific	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  human	  society,	  inspired	  by	  figures	  such	  as	  Issac	  Newton	  and	  Francis	  Bacon,	  we	  see	  the	  beginnings	  of	  modern	  sociology	  and	  concepts	  of	  society	  forming	  alongside	  these	  debates	  about	  how	  to	  reground	  political	  authority	  (Berry	  1997:	  52-­‐54;	  Muller	  1993:	  48-­‐54).	  	  This	  development	  provided	  yet	  another	  alternative	  to	  the	  problem,	  an	  idea	  of	  how	  social	  order	  was	  possible	  without	  authority,	  at	  least	  not	  as	  normally	  understood.	  	  To	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  the	  authority	  of	  nature	  is	  called	  to	  stand	  in,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  for	  the	  faltering	  authority	  of	  traditional	  elites.	  	  In	  a	  wider	  geopolitical	  frame,	  the	  American	  and	  French	  Revolutions	  were	  pivotal	  manifestations	  of	  the	  crisis	  of	  traditional	  monarchical	  authority,	  as	  over-­‐extended	  and	  under-­‐funded	  empires	  lost	  control	  of	  populations	  either	  in	  colonies	  or	  at	  home.	  	  But	  while	  revolutionary	  arguments	  were	  variously	  advanced	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  ‘the	  people’,	  ‘citizens’,	  ‘patriots’,	  and	  ‘nations’	  (Hont	  2005:	  474-­‐92;	  Leersen	  2006:	  71-­‐102),	  who	  exactly	  these	  people	  were,	  and	  how	  they	  would	  govern	  themselves,	  was	  disputed	  and	  unclear.	  	  Ultimately	  addressing	  the	  question	  was	  less	  a	  matter	  of	  forging	  a	  unified	  identity,	  and	  more	  one	  of	  ad	  hoc	  development	  of	  political	  systems	  for	  managing,	  more	  or	  less,	  contending	  identities.	  	  In	  the	  early	  United	  States,	  mistrusted	  political	  factionalism	  gradually	  stabalised	  into	  a	  competitive	  party	  system,	  with	  strong	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federalism	  and	  regional	  identities	  and	  interests	  preserved.	  	  In	  France	  factionalism	  led	  to	  internecine	  violence,	  and	  a	  cycling	  through	  forms	  of	  empire,	  monarchy	  and	  republic	  across	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  	  The	  central	  point	  here	  is	  that	  the	  nation,	  as	  self-­‐governing	  demos,	  arrived	  on	  the	  historical	  stage	  as	  a	  practical	  problem	  for	  both	  these	  countries,	  without	  there	  being	  a	  clear	  answer	  to	  questions	  of	  common	  identity	  for	  these	  groups.	  	  And	  in	  this	  process,	  questions	  of	  collective	  identity	  and	  political	  authority	  became	  indisoluably	  linked.	  	  Especially	  in	  these	  historically	  leading	  cases,	  national	  identity	  was	  not	  a	  driving	  force	  of	  events,	  but	  a	  problem,	  permanently	  instituted,	  to	  be	  answered	  from	  then	  on.	  
One	  of	  the	  more	  influential	  statements	  in	  recent	  nationalism	  theory	  about	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  term	  ‘nation’	  has	  been	  Liah	  Greenfeld’s	  ‘zigzag	  model’	  of	  development	  (1992:	  5-­‐9).	  	  She	  argues	  that	  from	  the	  medieval	  period	  conventional	  meanings	  have	  shifted	  as	  usage	  has	  passed	  through	  a	  series	  of	  new	  situations	  that	  have	  altered	  meanings	  by	  degrees.	  	  Thus	  she	  sees	  a	  development,	  from	  the	  medieval	  Latin	  natio	  as	  indicating	  any	  ‘group	  of	  foreigners’	  through	  senses	  as	  ‘a	  community	  of	  opinion’	  associated	  with	  student	  groups	  in	  medieval	  universities,	  as	  an	  ‘elite	  group’	  of	  representatives	  on	  Church	  councils,	  as	  a	  ‘sovereign	  people’	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  English	  population,	  and	  finally	  generalised	  to	  any	  such	  ‘unique	  people’	  in	  the	  world.	  	  The	  problem	  with	  portraying	  lexical	  change	  in	  this	  manner	  is	  that	  it	  treats	  words	  as	  individual	  species	  evolving	  in	  one	  course.	  	  In	  fact	  the	  process	  is	  much	  messier	  than	  this.	  	  Words	  acquire	  and	  shed	  clusters	  of	  meanings	  and	  associations	  through	  changing	  usage,	  sometimes	  acquiring	  total	  sets	  of	  uses	  and	  meanings	  that	  do	  not	  exactly	  cohere	  into	  a	  unified	  meaning.	  	  I	  think	  ‘nation’	  is	  better	  understood	  in	  this	  way.	  	  It’s	  current	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array	  of	  meanings,	  both	  in	  everyday	  and	  more	  academic	  and	  theoretical	  language,	  reflect	  an	  ambiguity	  that	  is	  built	  into	  it.	  	  	  ‘Nation’	  gets	  invoked	  as	  an	  object	  of	  patriotism	  and	  of	  sentimental	  attachment,	  as	  a	  civic	  ideal	  and	  a	  cultural	  heritage,	  as	  an	  innovative	  political	  project	  and	  as	  a	  defensive	  ethnic	  redoubt.	  	  I	  now	  try	  to	  show	  Adam	  Smith’s	  unintended	  contribution	  to	  this	  ambiguous	  heritage.	  
	  
The	  nation	  for	  Smith—a	  wealth	  of	  meanings:	  
My	  interest	  in	  Smith,	  and	  how	  he	  used	  the	  term	  nation,	  is	  in	  how	  this	  illustrates	  what	  was	  going	  on	  in	  this	  period.	  	  I	  am	  not	  looking	  for	  the	  roots	  of	  any	  specific	  current	  conception	  or	  theory	  in	  his	  writings,	  but	  rather	  at	  how	  those	  writings	  reflect	  the	  conceptual	  flux	  that	  was	  underway	  during	  Smith’s	  lifetime,	  especially	  the	  latter	  eighteenth	  century.	  	  	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  there	  are	  various	  aspects	  of	  Smith’s	  writings	  that	  illustrate	  my	  point.	  	  	  	  Any	  committed	  modernist	  theorist	  of	  nationalism	  must	  confront	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  word	  was	  certainly	  in	  common	  use	  well	  before	  the	  rise	  of	  industrial	  capitalism	  and	  the	  bureaucratic	  state.	  	  The	  eleventh	  edition	  of	  Nathan	  Bailey’s	  Universal	  
Etymological	  Dictionary	  	  (1745)	  defines	  a	  nation	  simply	  as	  ‘a	  people;	  also	  a	  country’	  (online:	  image	  575).	  	  Samuel	  Johnson’s	  Dictionary	  of	  1755	  indicates	  ‘a	  people	  distinguished	  from	  another	  people,	  generally	  by	  their	  language,	  origin[al],	  or	  government’	  (online:	  image	  191).	  	  These	  broad	  senses	  are	  perfectly	  familiar	  today.	  	  Smith’s	  usage	  is	  in	  keeping	  with	  these	  definitions,	  generally	  referring	  to	  culturally	  and	  historically	  defined	  peoples,	  often	  at	  contrasting	  levels	  of	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technological	  and	  economic	  development,	  and	  with	  their	  own	  governments	  capable	  of	  setting	  ‘policies’.i	  	  Thus	  the	  English,	  the	  Scots,	  the	  French,	  the	  Dutch,	  the	  Poles,	  were	  routinely	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘nations’.	  	  However,	  living	  under	  a	  common	  government	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  the	  government	  gets	  its	  authority	  or	  legitimacy	  directly	  from	  the	  people	  it	  governs.	  	  Nation	  at	  this	  point	  often	  gets	  used	  in	  similar	  ways	  to	  ‘race’	  and	  ‘species’,	  marking	  a	  social	  group	  or	  type	  recognisable	  due	  to	  external	  cultural	  signs,	  but	  not	  a	  political	  entity	  or	  agent	  as	  such.	  	  Our	  current	  concept	  of	  the	  ‘nation-­‐state’	  was	  already	  taking	  shape	  in	  the	  form	  of	  monarchical	  absolutism	  of	  the	  period	  (Hont	  2005:	  456-­‐63),	  and	  some	  uses	  of	  the	  word	  ‘nation’	  in	  Smith’s	  writings	  suggest	  in	  fact	  a	  shorthand	  for	  the	  state	  (or	  ‘sovereign’	  or	  ‘commonwealth’)	  as	  a	  political	  actor,	  e.g.	  ‘the	  policy	  of	  some	  nations	  has	  given	  extraordinary	  encouragement	  to	  the	  industry	  of	  the	  country’	  (1981:	  11;	  Introduction,	  7).ii	  	  But	  although	  linked	  in	  common	  usage,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  ‘nation’	  and	  the	  ‘state’	  was	  not	  what	  it	  is	  today,	  in	  a	  world	  now	  shaped	  by	  over	  two	  hundred	  years	  of	  democratisation.	  
Nonetheless,	  there	  were	  other	  things	  going	  on	  in	  Smith’s	  ideas,	  beyond	  conventional	  usage	  of	  the	  word	  ‘nation’,	  that	  do	  point	  toward	  our	  current,	  peculiarly	  legitimacy–linked,	  yet	  content-­‐loose	  conception	  of	  the	  nation,	  particularly	  as	  it	  has	  formed	  as	  part	  of	  the	  tradition	  of	  liberal	  thought.	  	  It	  is	  these	  aspects	  that	  I	  want	  to	  explore	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  article.	  	  I	  explore	  Smith’s	  ideas	  along	  three	  lines:	  (1)	  his	  way	  of	  imagining	  the	  scope	  and	  efficacy	  of	  affective	  ties	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  propinquity;	  (2)	  what	  he	  had	  to	  say	  about	  contemporary	  elites	  and	  their	  capacities	  for	  leadership;	  and	  (3),	  the	  idea	  of	  	  natural,	  self-­‐generating	  order	  in	  both	  the	  realms	  of	  morals	  and	  markets.	  	  His	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treatment	  of	  each	  of	  these	  has	  implications	  for	  the	  way	  the	  liberal	  democratic	  nation-­‐state	  would	  increasingly	  be	  imagined	  in	  the	  coming	  century.	  
	  
The	  scope	  of	  affective	  ties	  
In	  various	  ways,	  modern	  nationalism	  has	  been	  understood	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  affective	  ties	  binding	  the	  members	  of	  the	  nation	  to	  one	  another.	  	  In	  1882	  Ernest	  Renan	  claimed	  the	  nation	  was	  composed	  of	  two	  things:	  ‘the	  common	  possession	  of	  a	  rich	  legacy	  of	  memories’	  and	  ‘actual	  consent,	  the	  desire	  to	  live	  together’	  (1996:	  52).	  	  Benedict	  Anderson	  describes	  nations	  as	  ‘imagined	  communities’	  that	  are	  ‘always	  conceived	  as	  a	  deep,	  horizontal	  comradeship’	  (1991:	  7).	  	  And	  Bernard	  Yack	  has	  recently	  defined	  nations	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘community	  …	  a	  group	  of	  people	  who	  imagine	  themselves	  connected	  to	  each	  other	  as	  objects	  of	  special	  concern	  and	  loyalty	  by	  something	  that	  they	  share’	  (2012:	  68).	  	  	  	  There	  is	  wide	  agreement,	  even	  among	  those	  who	  emphasise	  the	  modernity	  of	  nations,	  about	  their	  underpinnings	  in	  human	  sentiments.	  
What	  Smith	  had	  to	  say	  about	  social	  bonds	  of	  sentiment	  is	  interesting	  in	  this	  light.	  	  One	  of	  his	  last	  writings	  was	  the	  new	  Part	  VI,	  ‘Of	  the	  Character	  of	  Virtue’	  (1984:	  212-­‐64),	  added	  to	  the	  sixth	  edition	  of	  the	  TMS	  in	  1790	  (see	  Hanley	  2009).	  	  Part	  VI	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  provide	  readers	  with	  a	  clearer	  summary	  of	  his	  analysis	  of	  morality	  and	  its	  dynamics	  than	  was	  offered	  in	  earlier	  editions.	  	  His	  approach	  is	  strikingly	  sociological.	  	  In	  it	  he	  offers	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘methodological	  individualism’iii	  in	  which	  the	  basic	  building	  block	  of	  social	  analysis	  is	  the	  individual	  and	  their	  capacity	  to	  prudently	  regulate	  their	  own	  actions	  in	  ways	  that	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maintain	  good	  relations	  with	  their	  fellows.	  	  He	  then	  moves	  on	  to	  discuss	  social	  propinquity,	  arguing	  that	  people	  naturally	  develop	  stronger	  ties	  of	  sympathy	  and	  identification	  with	  those	  closest	  to	  them,	  with	  whom	  they	  most	  frequently	  interact,	  such	  as	  through	  family	  ties	  or	  livelihoods,	  noting	  for	  instance	  that	  pastoral	  societies	  tend	  to	  intensify	  kinship	  ties,	  while	  commercial	  society	  tends	  to	  weaken	  ties	  in	  this	  dimension	  (1984:	  222-­‐3;	  VI.ii.1.12).	  	  He	  proceeds	  to	  explicitly	  discuss	  our	  wider	  social	  bonds	  with	  our	  ‘societies’,	  ‘nations’,	  ‘countries’	  (1984:	  227-­‐31;	  VI.ii.2.1-­‐11):	  
The	  state	  or	  sovereignty	  in	  which	  we	  have	  been	  born	  and	  educated,	  and	  under	  the	  protection	  of	  which	  we	  continue	  to	  live,	  is,	  in	  ordinary	  cases,	  the	  greatest	  society	  upon	  whose	  happiness	  or	  misery,	  our	  good	  or	  bad	  conduct	  can	  have	  much	  influence.	  	  It	  is	  accordingly,	  by	  nature,	  most	  strongly	  recommended	  to	  us.	  	  Not	  only	  we	  ourselves,	  but	  all	  the	  objects	  of	  our	  kindest	  affections,	  our	  children,	  our	  parents,	  our	  relations,	  our	  friends,	  our	  benefactors,	  all	  those	  whom	  we	  naturally	  love	  and	  revere	  the	  most,	  are	  commonly	  comprehended	  within	  it;	  and	  their	  prosperity	  and	  safety	  depend	  in	  some	  measure	  on	  its	  prosperity	  and	  safety.	  	  It	  is	  by	  nature,	  therefore,	  endeared	  to	  us,	  not	  only	  by	  our	  selfish,	  but	  by	  all	  our	  private	  benevolent	  affections	  (1984:	  227;	  VI.ii.2.2).	  
Thus	  Smith	  suggests	  that	  state	  societies	  represent	  one	  of	  the	  key	  contexts	  for,	  and	  maximal	  boundaries	  of,	  our	  natural	  sympathies.	  	  And	  this	  is	  presented	  as	  an	  insuperable	  aspect	  of	  social	  order.	  	  Very	  far	  from	  suggesting	  a	  world	  of	  individual	  atoms	  artificially	  bounded	  by	  constraining	  states,	  he	  suggest	  that	  ‘nations’	  and	  their	  states	  map	  onto	  the	  underlying	  principles	  of	  propinquity	  and	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sympathy,	  providing	  a	  certain	  intractable	  aspect	  of	  social	  structure.	  	  He	  is	  very	  alive	  to	  the	  dangers	  that	  this	  poses,	  in	  terms	  of	  prejudices	  and	  rivalries	  between	  nations,	  and	  the	  constraints	  this	  places	  on	  our	  capacity	  for	  more	  global,	  cosmopolitan	  identification:	  
We	  do	  not	  love	  our	  country	  merely	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  great	  society	  of	  mankind:	  we	  love	  it	  for	  its	  own	  sake,	  and	  independently	  of	  any	  such	  consideration.	  	  That	  wisdom	  which	  contrived	  the	  system	  of	  human	  affections,	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  every	  other	  part	  of	  nature,	  seems	  to	  have	  judged	  that	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  great	  society	  of	  mankind	  would	  be	  best	  promoted	  by	  directing	  the	  principal	  attention	  of	  each	  individual	  to	  that	  particular	  portion	  of	  it,	  which	  was	  most	  within	  the	  sphere	  both	  of	  his	  abilities	  and	  of	  his	  understanding	  (1984:	  229;	  VI.ii.2.4).	  
He	  then	  qualifies	  this	  image	  of	  national	  society	  by	  observing	  that	  all	  such	  societies	  are	  internally	  divided	  ‘into	  many	  different	  orders	  and	  societies’,	  what	  we	  would	  today	  call	  classes,	  interest	  groups,	  corporate	  bodies,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  He	  describes	  these	  as	  being	  in	  an	  uneasy	  balance	  of	  power,	  asserting	  that	  shifts	  in	  this	  balance	  of	  power	  can	  be	  a	  basic	  trigger	  of	  wider	  social	  change.	  	  He	  distinguishes	  here	  between	  the	  ‘public	  spirited’,	  who	  attempt	  to	  contribute	  to	  positive	  social	  change	  (i.e.	  ‘the	  reformer’),	  and	  the	  ‘man	  of	  system’,	  his	  term	  for	  the	  committed	  ideologue	  (i.e.	  ‘the	  radical’)	  that	  seeks	  root	  and	  branch	  social	  transformation	  according	  to	  an	  ideal	  plan.	  	  He	  is	  unambiguous	  about	  his	  preference	  for	  the	  former	  and	  distrust	  of	  the	  latter.	  	  The	  final	  section,	  ‘Of	  Self	  Command’	  (1984:	  237-­‐62;	  VI.iii),	  offers	  a	  sketch	  of	  the	  ideal	  person	  as	  one	  with	  an	  exceptional	  ability	  to	  know	  and	  regulate	  their	  own	  passions,	  thus	  able	  to	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negotiate	  the	  rough	  waters	  of	  the	  social	  world	  Smith	  has	  described,	  and	  achieve	  inner	  peace	  and	  happiness,	  as	  well	  as	  humanly	  possible.	  
It	  has	  recently	  been	  pointed	  out	  that	  Smith	  adapted	  this	  ‘concentric	  circle’	  model	  of	  human	  propinquity	  and	  the	  weakening	  ties	  of	  sympathy	  from	  the	  Stoic	  concept	  of	  oikeiösis,	  a	  generalizing	  of	  moral	  obligation	  by	  degrees,	  out	  from	  the	  self	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  humanity	  (Forman-­‐Barzilai	  2000:	  395;	  Hill	  2010).	  	  But	  whereas	  the	  Stoics	  sought	  to	  argue	  that	  virtue	  required	  the	  person	  to	  overcome	  their	  narrow	  horizons	  through	  the	  power	  of	  reason,	  to	  develop	  a	  universal	  magnanimity,	  Smith	  inverted	  the	  argument,	  using	  the	  model	  to	  show	  the	  natural	  limits	  of	  human	  sympathy,	  which	  in	  turn	  becomes	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  beneficent	  effects	  of	  an	  alternative	  basis	  of	  social	  relations—self-­‐interested	  yet	  mutually	  beneficial	  exchange	  through	  the	  market	  (I	  will	  return	  to	  this	  point	  below).	  	  	  This	  raises	  the	  fraught	  issue	  of	  how	  exactly	  to	  position	  Smith	  within	  intellectual	  traditions	  of	  civic	  humanism,	  republicanism,	  and	  natural	  law	  inherited	  from	  Cicero	  and	  the	  Stoics,	  which	  are	  too	  complex	  to	  enter	  into	  hereiv.	  	  	  However,	  we	  can	  at	  least	  recognise	  an	  enduring	  problematic	  about	  how	  to	  morally	  and	  legally	  relate	  individuals	  to	  humanity,	  that	  runs	  from	  the	  natural	  law	  theories	  of	  Cicero	  and	  the	  Roman	  lawyers,	  through	  Smith’s	  TMS,	  on	  up	  to	  current	  debates	  about	  necessity	  and	  justifiability	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  (Calhoun	  2007;	  MacCormick	  1999;	  Miller	  2004)	  in	  the	  face	  of	  cosmopolitan	  critiques	  (Habermas	  1996;	  Kaldor	  2004;	  Lichtenberg	  1999).	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Elites	  and	  leadership	  
The	  relationship	  of	  elites	  and	  political	  leaders	  to	  national	  publics	  is	  central	  to	  the	  conception	  of	  the	  modern	  nation-­‐state.	  	  While	  there	  were	  premodern	  forms	  of	  popular	  mobilization	  (often	  religious),	  with	  the	  spread	  of	  literacy,	  modern	  forms	  of	  communication,	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  democracy,	  it	  becomes	  incumbent	  upon	  elites	  to	  communicate	  in	  solidaristic	  ways	  with	  newly	  evolving	  ‘masses’.	  	  This	  is	  clearly	  evident	  in	  diverse	  national	  movements	  for	  statehood,	  whether	  through	  unification	  or	  secession,	  since	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  (Brass	  1991;	  Hechter	  2000;	  Hroch	  2000;	  Snyder	  2000).	  	  	  But	  even	  those	  states	  that	  inherited	  a	  relative	  unity	  of	  territory	  and	  culture	  from	  the	  period	  of	  absolutist	  consolidation	  (e.g.	  Britain,	  France,	  Spain)	  required	  a	  new	  language	  of	  the	  relationship	  of	  elites	  to	  masses.	  	  The	  British	  North	  American	  colonies	  that	  would	  become	  the	  US,	  and	  France,	  were	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  developing	  this	  new	  language	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  whereas	  in	  Britain	  this	  discourse	  emerged	  more	  gradually,	  in	  contention	  with	  arguments	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  more	  traditional	  forms	  of	  authority	  and	  leadership.	  	  It	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  remembered	  that	  notions	  of	  democracy	  in	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  century,	  and	  what	  it	  entailed,	  were	  much	  less	  fixed	  than	  they	  are	  for	  many	  of	  us	  today,	  with	  our	  highly	  routinised	  forms	  of	  regular	  elections	  and	  party	  systems.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  key	  intellectuals	  and	  political	  actors	  in	  the	  American	  Revolution,	  such	  as	  John	  Adams,	  Alexander	  Hamilton,	  and	  Thomas	  Jefferson,	  envisioned	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘natural	  aristocracy’	  of	  merit	  replacing	  de-­‐legitimised	  aristocracies	  of	  inheritance,	  but	  looked	  on	  at	  the	  formation	  of	  factionalised,	  interest	  group	  politics	  in	  the	  decades	  after	  the	  revolution	  with	  dismay.	  	  They	  saw	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it	  as	  the	  degeneration	  of	  their	  ideals	  into	  a	  grubby,	  low-­‐minded	  contest	  for	  power	  (Wood	  2009:	  Ch	  6;	  Jaume	  2008:	  267-­‐72).	  
It	  is	  interesting	  to	  consider	  Smith	  in	  this	  light,	  because	  he	  is	  routinely	  disparaging	  and	  deflationary	  in	  his	  treatment	  of	  traditional	  authorities.	  	  As	  Evensky	  observed,	  social	  criticism,	  directed	  at	  particular	  agents	  and	  institutions,	  was	  an	  important	  part	  of	  Smith’s	  agenda	  (1987,	  1989;	  cf.	  Gallagher	  1998).	  	  This	  is	  evident	  first	  in	  the	  frequently	  unflattering	  portrayals	  of	  the	  two	  traditional	  pillars	  of	  authority,	  the	  monarch,	  court	  and	  aristocracy	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  church	  and	  clergy	  on	  the	  other.	  	  In	  WN	  the	  baronial	  class	  is	  portrayed	  as	  bargaining	  away	  feudal	  powers	  and	  authority	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  conspicuous	  consumption	  (e.g.	  1981:	  418-­‐9;	  III.iv.10),	  and	  invidiously	  compared	  to	  the	  industrious,	  small-­‐holding	  agricultural	  improver	  and	  small	  manufacturers.	  	  Smith	  pursues	  this	  line	  of	  criticism	  to	  the	  apex	  of	  the	  social	  hierarchy,	  condemning	  the	  profligate	  and	  ‘spendthrift’	  ways	  of	  ‘kings	  and	  ministers’	  compared	  with	  the	  good	  sense	  of	  everyday	  people	  unable	  to	  live	  beyond	  their	  means:	  ‘Let	  them	  look	  after	  their	  own	  expense,	  and	  they	  may	  safely	  trust	  private	  people	  with	  theirs.	  	  If	  their	  own	  extravagance	  does	  not	  ruin	  the	  state,	  that	  of	  their	  subjects	  never	  will’	  (Smith	  1981:	  346;	  II.iii.36).	  
The	  occupants	  of	  society’s	  dominant	  religious	  institutions	  are	  portrayed	  in	  a	  similarly	  unflattering	  manner,	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  economic	  logic	  of	  conspicuous	  consumption:	  
The	  gradual	  improvements	  of	  arts,	  manufactures,	  and	  commerce,	  the	  same	  causes	  which	  destroyed	  the	  power	  of	  the	  great	  barons,	  destroyed	  in	  the	  same	  manner,	  through	  the	  greater	  part	  of	  Europe,	  the	  whole	  temporal	  
	   17	  
power	  of	  the	  clergy.	  	  	  In	  the	  produce	  of	  arts,	  manufactures	  and	  commerce,	  the	  clergy,	  like	  the	  great	  barons,	  found	  something	  for	  which	  they	  could	  exchange	  their	  rude	  produce,	  and	  thereby	  discovered	  the	  means	  of	  spending	  their	  whole	  revenues	  upon	  their	  own	  persons,	  without	  giving	  any	  considerable	  share	  of	  them	  to	  other	  people.	  	  Their	  charity	  became	  gradually	  less	  extensive,	  their	  hospitality	  less	  numerous,	  and	  by	  degrees	  dwindled	  away	  altogether	  …	  The	  inferior	  ranks	  of	  people	  no	  longer	  looked	  upon	  that	  order,	  as	  they	  had	  done	  before,	  as	  the	  comforters	  of	  their	  distress,	  and	  the	  relievers	  of	  their	  indigence.	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  they	  were	  provoked	  and	  disgusted	  by	  the	  vanity,	  luxury,	  and	  expense	  of	  the	  richer	  clergy,	  who	  appeared	  to	  spend	  upon	  their	  own	  pleasures	  what	  had	  always	  before	  been	  regarded	  as	  the	  patrimony	  of	  the	  poor	  (Smith	  1981:	  803-­‐804;	  V.i.g.25).	  
This	  passage	  exemplifies	  Smith’s	  attitude	  of	  disdain	  towards	  traditional	  authorities.	  	  In	  sum,	  Smith	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  majesty	  and	  authority	  of	  aristocracy	  and	  the	  clergy	  had	  worn	  thin,	  as	  these	  groups	  had allowed their power 
to serve their narrow self-interest.	  	  Clergies	  neglect	  their	  parishioners	  and	  become	  distracted	  by	  luxuries.	  	  Monarchs	  spend	  beyond	  their	  means	  on	  war	  and	  pomp.	  	  Aristocrats	  chase	  vainly	  after	  baubles,	  inadvertently	  stimulating	  economic	  growth	  and	  undermining	  their	  authority	  in	  the	  process.	  	  As	  is	  well-­‐known,	  newer	  power-­‐holders,	  the	  large	  merchants,	  did	  not	  fare	  any	  better	  in	  Smith’s	  hands.	  	  They	  are	  viewed	  sceptically	  as	  inclined	  towards	  collusion	  to	  distort	  markets	  and	  competition,	  and	  protect	  narrow	  self-­‐interest,	  not	  as	  new	  candidates	  for	  social	  authority	  (1981:	  267;	  I.xi.p.10).	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In	  corresponding	  fashion,	  Smith’s	  treatment	  of	  ordinary,	  non-­‐elite	  people,	  often	  seems	  designed	  to	  elevate	  them	  in	  comparison.	  	  Discussing	  the	  human	  capacity	  to	  form	  ‘divisions	  of	  labour’	  by	  agreement,	  he	  observes	  that	  compared	  to	  the	  qualitative	  differences	  in	  abilities	  between	  breeds	  of	  dogs,	  the	  differences	  between	  a	  ‘philosopher’	  and	  a	  ‘street	  porter’	  are	  minimal	  (1981:	  28-­‐30;	  I.ii.4-­‐5).	  	  Although	  he	  believes	  that	  ‘the	  common	  people	  cannot,	  in	  any	  civilised	  society,	  be	  so	  well	  instructed	  as	  people	  of	  some	  rank	  and	  fortune’	  (1981:	  785;	  V.i.f.54),	  nonetheless	  his	  entire	  discussion	  of	  the	  possibilities	  of	  a	  system	  of	  publically	  funded	  education,	  rests	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  ordinary	  human	  potential	  is	  wasted	  by	  narrow	  confinement	  to	  manual	  occupations	  (1981:	  758-­‐814;	  V.i.f-­‐g).	  	  	  In	  TMS,	  contemplating	  the	  workings	  of	  conscience	  that	  lead	  us	  to	  humble	  our	  feelings	  of	  self-­‐love	  and	  remember	  to	  value	  others,	  he	  observes	  that:	  	  
Neither	  is	  this	  sentiment	  confined	  to	  men	  of	  extraordinary	  magnanimity	  and	  virtue.	  	  It	  is	  deeply	  impressed	  upon	  every	  tolerably	  good	  soldier,	  who	  feels	  that	  he	  would	  become	  the	  scorn	  of	  his	  companions	  if	  he	  could	  be	  supposed	  capable	  of	  shrinking	  from	  danger,	  or	  of	  hesitating	  either	  to	  expose	  or	  throw	  away	  his	  life	  when	  the	  good	  of	  the	  service	  required	  it	  (Smith	  1984:	  138;	  III.3.5).	  
Generosity	  of	  spirit	  is	  not	  an	  elite	  trait—it	  is	  normal.	  	  I	  will	  say	  more	  about	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  moral	  order	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  Here	  the	  main	  point	  is	  that	  there	  is	  an	  ambiguous	  attitude	  in	  Smith,	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  accepting	  the	  necessity	  of	  social	  hierarchy,	  while	  on	  the	  other	  disparaging	  the	  occupants	  of	  traditional	  positions	  of	  authority,	  and	  all	  the	  while	  asserting	  the	  general	  moral	  and	  practical	  abilities	  of	  human	  beings	  in	  general.	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Smith	  seems	  to	  have	  seen	  no	  clear	  alternative	  to	  traditional	  forms	  of	  aristocratic	  social	  hierarchy.	  	  He	  pragmatically	  accepts	  that	  supporting	  the	  opulence	  and	  dignity	  of	  a	  sovereign	  monarch,	  as	  an	  object	  of	  high	  esteem,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  normal	  public	  expenses	  that	  must	  be	  met	  (1981:	  814;	  V.i.h.1-­‐3).	  	  He	  believed	  that	  good	  fortune,	  wealth	  and	  power	  were	  natural	  objects	  of	  respect,	  and	  that	  this	  propensity	  was	  the	  insuperable	  source	  of	  ‘the	  distinction	  of	  ranks’.	  	  As	  he	  put	  it	  in	  the	  TMS:	  
Nature	  has	  wisely	  judged	  that	  the	  distinction	  of	  ranks,	  the	  peace	  and	  order	  of	  society,	  would	  rest	  more	  securely	  on	  the	  plain	  and	  palpable	  difference	  of	  birth	  and	  fortune,	  than	  upon	  the	  invisible	  and	  often	  uncertain	  difference	  of	  wisdom	  and	  virtue.	  	  The	  undistinguishing	  eyes	  of	  the	  great	  mob	  of	  mankind	  can	  well	  enough	  perceive	  the	  former:	  it	  is	  with	  great	  difficulty	  that	  the	  nice	  discernment	  of	  the	  wise	  and	  the	  virtuous	  can	  sometimes	  distinguish	  the	  latter	  (1984:	  226;	  VI.ii.I.20).	  
Although	  notions	  of	  ‘merit’	  have	  perhaps	  supplanted	  ‘birth’,	  admiration	  for	  wealth	  and	  power	  (and	  celebrity),	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  driving	  force	  in	  society	  today,	  vindicating	  Smith’s	  assessment,	  at	  least	  in	  part.	  	  Nicholas	  Phillipson’s	  (2011)	  recent	  biography	  of	  Smith	  suggests	  that	  given	  this	  position,	  Smith’s	  hope	  was	  to	  reform,	  through	  his	  writings	  and	  teaching,	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  the	  aristocracy/gentry,	  in	  the	  new	  ways	  and	  demands	  of	  commercial	  society,	  including	  the	  crucial	  need	  for	  renewed	  industry	  and	  leadership	  on	  the	  part	  of	  this	  social	  stratum.	  	  He	  had	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  direction	  of	  social	  change,	  and	  the	  need	  for	  patterns	  of	  social	  leadership	  to	  adapt,	  even	  if	  this	  did	  not	  take	  the	  form	  deliberate	  political	  transformation.	  	  So,	  in	  a	  limited	  sense,	  I	  am	  arguing	  that	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Smith	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  early	  ‘nation-­‐builder’,	  or	  ‘rebuilder’,	  concerned	  with	  the	  quality	  of	  both	  the	  ‘builders’	  (the	  elites)	  and	  the	  ‘building	  materials’	  (the	  people).	  	  
	  
Morals,	  markets	  and	  natural	  order	  
In	  an	  audacious	  analysis,	  Susan	  E.	  Gallagher	  has	  argued	  that	  Smith	  ultimately	  ‘rejected	  authority	  itself	  …	  seeing	  no	  way	  to	  attach	  political	  authority	  to	  genuine	  superiority,	  he	  let	  go	  of	  government	  as	  the	  determining	  factor	  of	  social	  life’	  (1998:	  98).	  	  For	  the	  reasons	  just	  given,	  I	  think	  this	  is	  overstated.	  	  Her	  more	  general	  point	  however,	  that	  Smith’s	  conception	  of	  the	  self-­‐regulating	  capacities	  of	  a	  commercial	  economy	  tended	  to	  obviate	  the	  need	  for	  strong	  political	  leadership,	  is	  correct.	  	  Central	  to	  Smith’s	  approach	  is	  to	  counter-­‐pose	  the	  natural	  order	  of	  society	  in	  general,	  to	  the	  often	  narrow	  and	  distorting	  agendas	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  elites.	  	  Where	  elites	  are	  inadequate,	  society	  can	  pick	  up	  the	  slack.	  	  While	  Smith	  was	  no	  revolutionary,	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  perspective	  for	  those	  who	  were	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  consulting	  the	  writings	  of	  Thomas	  Paine.	  	  For	  Paine,	  the	  challenge	  that	  the	  new	  republican	  democracies	  of	  the	  US	  and	  France	  posed	  for	  traditional	  rule	  in	  Britain,	  was	  precisely	  that	  of	  the	  natural	  authority	  of	  ‘society’	  over	  that	  of	  ‘government’.	  	  	  A	  passage	  in	  The	  Rights	  of	  Man,	  Part	  II	  (1792)	  strongly	  echoes	  Smith’s	  ideasv:	  
A	  great	  part	  of	  that	  order	  which	  reigns	  among	  mankind	  is	  not	  the	  effect	  of	  government.	  	  It	  had	  its	  origins	  in	  the	  principle	  of	  society	  and	  the	  natural	  constitution	  of	  man.	  	  It	  existed	  prior	  to	  government,	  and	  would	  exist	  if	  the	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formality	  of	  government	  was	  abolished.	  	  The	  mutual	  dependence	  and	  reciprocal	  interest	  which	  man	  has	  in	  man,	  and	  all	  the	  parts	  of	  a	  civilized	  community	  upon	  each	  other,	  create	  that	  great	  chain	  of	  connection	  which	  holds	  it	  together.	  …	  the	  laws	  which	  common	  usage	  ordains	  have	  a	  greater	  influence	  than	  the	  laws	  	  of	  government.	  	  In	  fine,	  society	  performs	  for	  itself	  almost	  everything	  which	  is	  ascribed	  to	  government	  (1989[1792]:	  155).	  
Paine	  subscribed	  to	  a	  notion	  of	  the	  ‘social	  contract’	  that	  Smith,	  like	  Hume,	  would	  have	  rejected,	  believing	  that	  government	  was	  normally	  founded	  on	  usurpation	  or	  conquest.	  	  But	  for	  Paine	  the	  point	  of	  this	  metaphor	  was	  not	  that	  rulers	  got	  their	  authority	  from	  a	  collective	  act	  of	  consent,	  but	  rather,	  as	  in	  the	  quote	  above,	  that	  government	  as	  such	  emerges	  out	  of	  the	  common	  needs	  of	  members	  of	  society,	  and	  this	  is	  a	  view	  that	  concords	  with	  the	  Scots	  (see	  Hume,	  ‘Of	  the	  Original	  Contract’,	  1985:	  468;	  on	  Smith	  cf.	  Winch	  1978:	  51-­‐3).	  	  	  
Smith’s	  approach	  to	  this	  self-­‐ordering	  capacity	  of	  society	  that	  Paine	  celebrates	  is	  evident	  in	  both	  the	  TMS	  and	  the	  WN.	  	  A	  point	  that	  is	  often	  overlooked	  here,	  is	  that	  it	  was	  not	  just	  in	  the	  economy,	  but	  in	  society	  as	  a	  whole,	  that	  Smith	  identified	  a	  natural	  self-­‐regulating	  order.	  Both	  moral	  order	  and	  economic	  order	  emerge	  more	  or	  less	  naturally,	  from	  the	  ground	  up,	  for	  Smith.	  	  	  This	  is	  what	  Hayek	  came	  to	  call	  ‘spontaneous	  order’	  (2012[1973]:	  Ch	  2;	  cf.	  Hamowy	  1987),	  the	  possibility	  that	  relatively	  stable	  order	  can	  arise	  out	  of	  human	  interactions	  without	  any	  central	  guiding	  authority.	  	  Discussing	  the	  Scottish	  Enlightenment,	  Christopher	  Berry	  (1997:	  52-­‐4)	  has	  suggested	  the	  label	  ‘Baconianism’	  to	  describe	  the	  pervasive	  scientific	  and	  utilitarian	  spirit	  of	  the	  time,	  particularly	  inspired	  by	  Francis	  Bacon’s	  programmatic	  writing	  on	  the	  benefits	  of	  science.	  	  To	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guide	  action	  in	  the	  world	  one	  must	  understand	  how	  it	  operates,	  according	  to	  its	  own	  principles.	  	  By	  adding	  this	  more	  naturalistic	  perspective,	  the	  TMS	  and	  the	  WN	  answered	  how	  social	  order	  could	  emerge	  in	  both	  the	  moral	  and	  economic	  spheres,	  without	  a	  clear	  locus	  of	  direction	  and	  command	  from	  above.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  suggests	  the	  possibilities	  and	  limits	  of	  deliberate	  intervention	  in	  these	  processes.	  	  Crucial	  to	  the	  present	  line	  of	  argument,	  modern	  ideas	  of	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  self-­‐governing	  people	  were	  emerging	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  thinkers	  such	  as	  Smith	  were	  displacing,	  or	  at	  least	  supplementing,	  traditional	  notions	  of	  social	  authority	  with	  this	  idea	  of	  natural	  order.	  
There	  is	  of	  course	  a	  long-­‐standing	  debate	  about	  the	  compatibility	  of	  a	  youthful	  Smith	  of	  the	  TMS	  focused	  on	  morality	  generated	  by	  natural	  sympathy,	  with	  an	  older	  Smith	  of	  WN	  revealing	  the	  inner	  logic	  of	  self-­‐interest—the	  supposed	  ‘Adam	  Smith	  Problem’	  (Haakonssen and Winch 2006; Raphael and Macfie 1984: 20-25; 
Teichgraeber 1981).	  	  I	  agree	  with	  those	  who	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  real	  problem.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  Smith	  was	  still	  revising	  TMS	  long	  after	  the	  publication	  of	  WN	  in	  1776	  without	  rejecting	  its	  initial	  premises	  is	  a	  strong	  indication	  that	  he	  saw	  no	  fundamental	  contradiction	  between	  the	  two	  books.	  	  Andreas	  Kalyvas	  and	  Ira	  Katznelson	  (2008:	  Ch	  2,	  see	  especially	  pp.	  39-­‐44)	  have	  recently	  argued	  that	  Smith’s	  work	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  unified	  by	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  ‘recognition’	  and	  a	  ‘rhetoric	  of	  persuasion’.	  	  They	  argue	  that	  pursuit	  of	  the	  praise,	  admiration,	  and	  high	  opinion	  of	  others	  is	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  both	  accounts,	  of	  morality	  and	  markets.	  	  As	  others	  have	  argued	  (e.g.	  Heilbroner	  1986:	  58)	  the	  role	  of	  ‘sympathy’	  in	  TMS	  is	  as	  a	  general	  condition,	  the	  natural	  ability	  and	  propensity	  of	  persons	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  feelings	  of	  others.	  	  But	  this	  in	  itself	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  generate	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moral	  order.	  	  It	  is	  the	  desire	  for	  approval,	  and	  to	  avoid	  disapproval,	  that	  sets	  things	  in	  motion,	  as	  behaviours	  mutually	  adjust,	  and	  sometimes	  conflict,	  toward	  this	  end.	  	  This	  is	  what	  gets	  stable	  systems	  of	  moral	  rules	  of	  conduct	  established.	  	  The	  same	  dynamic	  underlies	  Smith’s	  economic	  theory.	  	  To	  satisfy	  our	  wants	  and	  needs	  we	  must	  agree	  to	  diverge	  in	  our	  specialisations,	  and	  persuade	  others	  to	  exchange	  with	  us.	  	  An	  appeal	  to	  the	  self-­‐interest	  of	  others	  is	  still	  an	  appeal	  for	  their	  approval	  of	  what	  we	  offer,	  and	  that	  of	  course	  works	  both	  ways.	  	  And	  very	  often	  we	  want	  the	  things	  we	  want	  for	  vanity’s	  sake,	  because	  of	  how	  they	  will	  affect	  the	  opinions	  of	  others	  about	  us.	  	  Thus	  the	  search	  for	  recognition	  and	  approval	  pervades	  society,	  including	  the	  economy.	  	  Sympathy	  and	  self-­‐interest	  play	  their	  parts,	  but	  the	  central	  dynamic	  lies	  in	  how	  this	  natural	  concern	  for	  the	  regard	  of	  others	  directs	  human	  behaviour.	  	  So	  not	  only	  is	  there	  not	  an	  ‘Adam	  Smith	  Problem’,	  but	  both	  works	  have	  very	  similar	  analytic	  strategies,	  the	  central	  thrust	  of	  which	  is	  to	  show	  that	  there	  are	  natural	  tendencies	  towards	  mutually	  beneficial	  sociability	  among	  humans,	  that	  can	  be	  cultivated	  and	  encouraged	  if	  the	  appropriate	  ‘light-­‐touch’	  approach	  is	  taken.	  	  	  
Another	  aspect	  of	  Smith’s	  reconfiguration	  of	  authority	  in	  TMS	  is	  his	  treatment	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  God.	  	  In	  the	  deistic	  language	  of	  the	  day,	  his	  is	  a	  rather	  naturalised	  God,	  signaled	  by	  such	  terms	  as	  ‘the	  great	  Director	  of	  the	  Universe’	  (Smith	  1984:	  236;	  VI.ii.3.4)	  and	  ‘The	  all-­‐wise	  Author	  of	  Nature’	  (Smith	  1984:	  128;	  III.2.31).	  	  Smith	  was	  keen	  to	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  general	  rules	  of	  morality	  that	  are	  essential	  for	  the	  good	  order	  of	  society,	  and	  in	  some	  respects	  seems	  to	  anchor	  these	  in	  ‘human	  nature’,	  and	  in	  other	  respects,	  in	  the	  ‘laws	  of	  the	  Deity’:	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But	  upon	  the	  tolerable	  observance	  of	  these	  duties,	  depends	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  human	  society,	  which	  would	  crumble	  into	  nothing	  if	  mankind	  were	  not	  generally	  impressed	  with	  a	  reverence	  for	  those	  important	  rules	  of	  conduct.	  	  	  
	   This	  reverence	  is	  still	  further	  enhanced	  by	  an	  opinion	  which	  is	  first	  impressed	  by	  nature,	  and	  afterwards	  confirmed	  by	  reasoning	  and	  philosophy,	  that	  those	  important	  rules	  of	  morality	  are	  the	  commands	  and	  laws	  of	  the	  Deity,	  who	  will	  finally	  reward	  the	  obedient,	  and	  punish	  the	  transgressors	  of	  their	  duty	  (Smith	  1984:	  163;	  III.5.2-­‐3).	  
Careful	  inspection	  here	  shows	  that	  Smith	  is	  not	  so	  much	  asserting	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  deity,	  as	  the	  reality	  of	  beliefs	  in	  the	  deity.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  be	  sure	  exactly	  what	  Smith’s	  beliefs	  were	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  God.	  This	  touches	  a	  perplexing	  issue	  that	  Phillipson	  (2011)	  addresses,	  in	  regard	  to	  Smith’s	  reluctance	  to	  carry	  out,	  or	  be	  associated	  with,	  one	  of	  his	  good	  friend	  David	  Hume’s	  last	  wishes,	  to	  have	  his	  Dialogues	  Concerning	  Natural	  Religion	  published	  posthumously.	  	  Phillipson	  figures	  that	  Smith	  was	  close	  to	  sharing	  Hume’s	  disbelief	  in	  God,	  though	  not	  Hume’s	  propensity	  for	  irreligion.	  	  Thus	  it	  seems	  that	  Smith	  was	  simply	  squeamish,	  placing	  his	  own	  public	  reputation	  above	  the	  wishes	  of	  his	  friend.	  	  However	  I	  suspect,	  admittedly	  speculatively,	  that	  Smith	  was	  very	  conscious	  of	  trying	  to	  effect	  a	  general	  change	  in	  public	  understanding	  of	  morality,	  and	  authority,	  and	  that	  whatever	  his	  own	  beliefs,	  doubted	  that	  his	  elevation	  of	  the	  natural	  bases	  of	  human	  morality,	  could	  withstand	  the	  simultaneous	  removal	  of	  divine	  sanction.	  	  In	  classic	  Protestant-­‐cum-­‐deist	  fashion,	  he	  was	  writing-­‐out	  the	  ‘middelmen’,	  the	  church,	  clergy,	  and	  their	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authority,	  to	  create	  an	  enhanced	  space	  for	  self-­‐command,	  bolstered	  by	  ‘the	  Author	  of	  Nature.’vi	  
To	  continue	  the	  argument	  in	  the	  same	  direction,	  Smith’s	  moral	  philosophy	  and	  political	  economy	  converge	  in	  relocating	  the	  mainsprings	  of	  social	  order	  in	  human	  nature,	  not	  divine	  will	  or	  traditional	  rights	  to	  rule.	  	  In	  his	  hands	  authority	  and	  wisdom	  become	  naturalised,	  democratised,	  and	  vernacularised.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  the	  ‘impartial	  spectator’	  is	  a	  prime	  example.	  	  This	  notion	  of	  conscience,	  while	  perhaps	  having	  some	  divine	  underpinnings,	  is	  presented	  very	  much	  as	  a	  psychological	  mechanism	  grounded	  in	  human	  nature	  (anticipating	  the	  later	  arguments	  about	  self	  and	  identity	  made	  by	  G.	  H.	  Mead	  1967[1934]).	  	  As	  Smith	  puts	  it:	  
When	  I	  endeavor	  to	  examine	  my	  own	  conduct,	  when	  I	  endeavor	  to	  pass	  sentence	  on	  it,	  and	  either	  to	  approve	  or	  condemn	  it,	  it	  is	  evident	  that,	  in	  all	  such	  cases,	  I	  divide	  myself,	  as	  it	  were,	  into	  two	  persons;	  and	  that	  I,	  the	  examiner	  and	  judge,	  represent	  a	  different	  character	  from	  that	  other	  I,	  the	  person	  whose	  conduct	  is	  examined	  into	  and	  judged	  of	  (Smith	  1984:	  113).	  
And	  this	  general	  capacity	  that	  we	  all	  have,	  to	  see	  ourselves	  through	  the	  eyes	  of	  a	  generalised	  other,	  although	  it	  is	  more	  developed	  in	  some	  people,	  is	  seen	  as	  sufficient	  to	  serve	  a	  fundamental	  regulating	  function	  for	  human	  social	  interaction.	  
Every	  man	  is,	  no	  doubt,	  by	  nature,	  first	  and	  principally	  recommended	  to	  his	  own	  care;	  and	  as	  he	  is	  fitter	  to	  take	  care	  of	  himself,	  than	  of	  any	  other	  person,	  it	  is	  fit	  and	  right	  that	  it	  should	  be	  so	  …	  If	  he	  would	  act	  so	  as	  that	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the	  impartial	  spectator	  may	  enter	  into	  the	  principles	  of	  his	  conduct,	  which	  is	  what	  of	  all	  things	  he	  has	  the	  greatest	  desire	  to	  do,	  he	  must	  upon	  this,	  as	  upon	  all	  other	  occasions,	  humble	  the	  arrogance	  of	  his	  self-­‐love,	  and	  bring	  it	  down	  to	  something	  other	  men	  can	  go	  along	  with	  (Smith	  1984:	  82-­‐83)	  
The	  key	  message	  here	  is	  that	  we	  have	  a	  natural	  if	  imperfect	  capacity	  for	  self-­‐governance,	  which	  can	  be	  cultivated	  (and	  lightly	  guided	  by	  government,	  particularly	  in	  its	  administration	  of	  justice).	  	  If	  there	  is	  a	  God,	  his	  practical	  agent	  on	  Earth	  is	  the	  impartial	  spectator,	  who	  in	  many	  instances	  is	  fitter	  to	  govern	  than	  other	  human	  rulers.	  	  It	  is	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  impartial	  spectator,	  which	  a	  few	  can	  obtain	  with	  exceptional	  breadth	  and	  humanity,	  but	  most	  can	  adopt	  to	  some	  degree,	  that	  enables	  people	  to	  regulate	  their	  social	  and	  moral	  conduct.	  	  	  	  	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  WN	  correspondingly	  shows	  how	  the	  pursuit	  of	  status	  and	  respect	  through	  ‘conspicuous	  consumption’	  unintentionally	  promotes	  economic	  growth	  and	  the	  dispersal	  of	  power	  away	  from	  the	  traditional	  ruling	  elites.	  	  Guided	  by	  the	  reliable	  administration	  of	  justice	  and	  protection	  of	  private	  property,	  and	  forms	  of	  needed	  social	  investment	  from	  the	  state	  that	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  taken	  on	  by	  private	  actors,	  the	  population	  as	  a	  whole	  can	  work	  to	  mutual	  benefit,	  while	  individuals	  primarily	  concern	  themselves	  with	  their	  own	  personal	  interest	  (1981:	  Book	  V).	  	  Thus	  the	  problems	  of	  moral	  myopia	  and	  parochialism,	  the	  limited	  scope	  of	  human	  sympathy	  intrinsic	  to	  human	  nature,	  are	  not	  insurmountable	  if	  certain	  ‘rules	  of	  the	  game’	  are	  laid	  down	  and	  observed,	  and	  certain	  inherent	  principles	  of	  social	  organisation	  maximised.	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In	  this	  context	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  we	  should	  take	  the	  WN	  at	  its	  word.	  	  It	  has	  a	  lot	  to	  say	  about	  the	  functioning	  of	  markets,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  ‘division	  of	  labour’	  that	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  and	  starting	  point	  of	  Smith’s	  analysis.	  	  We	  are	  so	  familiar	  with	  this	  idea	  now	  that	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  overlook	  the	  work	  it	  is	  doing	  in	  WN,	  not	  simply	  as	  a	  recipe	  for	  efficient	  production	  and	  economic	  growth,	  but	  as	  an	  analysis	  of	  human	  nature	  and	  the	  limits	  and	  potentials	  of	  human	  sociability.	  	  Smith	  traces	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  division	  of	  labour	  to	  an	  original	  propensity	  to	  ‘truck,	  barter	  and	  exchange	  one	  thing	  for	  another’	  (1981:	  25;	  I.ii.1).	  	  In	  the	  following	  pages	  there	  is	  a	  recurring	  contrast	  between	  humans	  and	  animals	  (dogs	  in	  particular)	  the	  point	  of	  which	  is	  that	  animals	  only	  appear	  to	  coordinate	  their	  actions	  by	  agreement,	  for	  instance	  when	  hunting	  together,	  whereas	  for	  humans,	  doing	  so	  is	  basic	  to	  their	  nature.	  	  Although	  it	  contains	  the	  famous	  passage	  about	  the	  ‘butcher,	  the	  brewer,	  or	  the	  baker’	  and	  how	  we	  ‘address	  ourselves	  not	  to	  their	  humanity,	  but	  to	  their	  self-­‐love’	  (1981:	  27;	  I.ii.2),	  the	  main	  thrust	  of	  the	  chapter	  is	  that	  we	  are	  insufficient	  as	  individuals	  to	  meet	  our	  own	  needs	  beyond	  the	  basics,	  but	  that	  fortunately	  we	  are	  so	  constituted	  that	  we	  are	  inclined	  to	  ‘scratch	  each	  other’s	  backs’,	  to	  negotiate	  ways	  to	  specialise	  and	  exchange	  to	  mutual	  advantage.	  	  	  	  Smith	  can	  be	  read	  as	  using	  the	  image	  of	  the	  division	  of	  labour	  to	  undergird	  the	  entire	  argument	  of	  the	  WN.	  	  He	  begins	  in	  Book	  I,	  Chapter	  1,	  with	  the	  simple	  and	  familiar	  example	  of	  the	  pin	  factory,	  and	  the	  obvious	  boost	  to	  production	  that	  the	  division	  of	  labour	  provides	  there.	  	  In	  this	  instance,	  the	  division	  is	  embedded	  in	  a	  producing	  organisation,	  as	  much	  a	  matter	  of	  command	  from	  above	  as	  of	  free	  negotiation.	  	  But	  in	  the	  next	  two	  chapters	  the	  principle	  is	  extended	  and	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historicised,	  to	  argue	  the	  origins	  of	  more	  complex	  divisions	  of	  labour	  in	  village	  life,	  as	  craft	  specialists	  exchange	  wares	  and	  services,	  and	  separate	  societies	  located	  around	  major	  rivers	  (e.g.	  the	  Nile)	  and	  inland	  oceans	  (e.g.	  the	  Mediterranean)	  begin	  to	  develop	  inter-­‐societal	  trade.	  	  As	  the	  WN	  proceeds,	  although	  the	  term	  becomes	  more	  implicit,	  the	  underlying	  image	  continues.	  	  So	  the	  argument	  in	  Book	  III,	  that	  in	  the	  European	  case,	  growth	  of	  cities	  and	  demands	  of	  urban	  and	  elite	  consumption	  drive	  rural	  agricultural	  development,	  instantiates	  the	  division	  at	  yet	  a	  larger	  scale	  between	  town	  and	  country.	  	  And	  the	  critique	  of	  the	  ‘mercantile	  system’	  of	  political	  economy	  in	  Book	  IV	  in	  effect	  argues	  that	  the	  zero-­‐sum	  competition	  between	  states	  to	  monopolise	  precious	  metals	  and	  prosperous	  trades	  is	  self-­‐defeating.	  	  Mercantile	  rivalry	  should	  be	  replaced	  with	  an	  international	  division	  of	  labour,	  through	  principles	  of	  free	  trade.	  	  The	  core	  trajectory	  of	  the	  WN’s	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  division	  of	  labour	  is	  a	  fundamental	  expression	  of	  human	  sociability,	  that	  it	  has	  led	  to	  growing	  ‘opulence’	  within	  the	  established	  nations	  of	  the	  time	  (especially	  in	  Western	  Europe),	  and	  that	  it	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  increase	  peace	  and	  prosperity	  among	  nations,	  if	  allowed	  to	  develop	  and	  function	  through	  international	  trade.	  There	  are	  many	  problems	  ultimately	  implied	  here,	  such	  as	  the	  sustainability	  of	  endless	  economic	  growth,	  and	  the	  capacity	  of	  divisions	  of	  labour	  to	  take	  extremely	  hierarchical	  and	  unequal	  forms.	  	  My	  key	  point	  is	  simply	  that	  this	  concept	  is	  central	  to	  Smith’s	  argument	  about	  how	  small-­‐scale	  social	  negotiations	  and	  exchanges	  can	  articulate	  into	  ever-­‐larger	  self-­‐regulating	  systems,	  in	  which	  the	  people,	  in	  effect,	  appear	  to	  govern	  themselves,	  as	  Paine	  would	  wish.	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In	  all	  these	  arguments	  we	  can	  see	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  familiarly	  modern	  conception	  of	  ‘society’	  as	  a	  reality	  sui	  generis,	  as	  a	  system	  with	  its	  own	  emergent	  rules	  and	  order,	  not	  created	  from	  above,	  and	  also	  more	  than	  ‘the	  sum	  of	  its	  parts’	  (cf.	  Foucault	  2000).	  	  It	  is	  standard	  in	  teaching	  sociology	  these	  days	  to	  warn	  students	  not	  to	  simply	  equate	  ‘society’	  with	  the	  ‘nation-­‐state’.	  	  This	  is	  known	  as	  the	  error	  of	  ‘methodological	  nationalism’	  (Chernilo	  2006;	  Wimmer	  and	  Glick-­‐Schiller	  2002).	  	  This	  is	  salutary	  advice.	  	  And	  it	  is	  true	  that	  there	  are	  multiple	  forms	  and	  dimensions	  of	  society,	  many	  of	  which	  cut	  across	  state	  boundaries	  (international	  elites,	  labour	  migrants,	  transnational	  social	  movements,	  and	  so	  on).	  	  But	  our	  tendency	  towards	  confusion	  is	  there	  for	  real	  historical	  reasons.	  	  	  Because,	  as	  evident	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  Smith,	  our	  modern	  conceptions	  of	  the	  nation,	  and	  of	  society,	  took	  shape	  around	  the	  same	  time,	  as	  the	  older	  political	  order	  of	  monarchs,	  patrimonialism	  and	  patronage,	  was	  giving	  way	  to	  a	  new,	  still	  forming	  conception	  of	  self-­‐governing,	  self-­‐legitimating	  peoples,	  that	  were	  at	  the	  same	  time	  societies	  governed	  by	  principles	  of	  natural	  order.	  	  Our	  transformed	  conceptions	  of	  ‘nation’	  and	  ‘society’	  were	  born	  out	  of	  the	  same	  general	  milieu,	  which	  involved	  the	  reconfiguration,	  and	  difficult	  democratisation,	  of	  authority.	  	  Although	  Smith	  did	  not	  foresee	  or	  advocate	  the	  elaborate	  institutionalised	  forms	  of	  mass	  democracy	  that	  would	  eventually	  develop	  in	  the	  era	  of	  nationalism,	  I	  claim	  that	  his	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  society	  sowed	  seeds	  that	  eventually	  served	  that	  end.	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Conclusion	  
The	  literature	  on	  Smith	  has	  expanded	  greatly	  in	  recent	  years,	  and	  benefited	  from	  calls	  to	  understand	  his	  work	  in	  terms	  of	  debates	  prevalent	  in	  his	  own	  day,	  without	  treating	  it	  as	  simply	  the	  lineal	  antecedent	  to	  current	  economic	  theories	  (Winch	  1978;	  Teichgraeber	  1987).	  	  Much	  has	  been	  gained	  by	  trying	  to	  understand	  Smith’s	  work	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  in	  its	  original	  context.	  (e.g.	  Hont	  and	  Ignatieff	  1983;	  Muller	  1993).	  	  It	  might	  seem	  at	  first	  that	  by	  using	  Smith	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  current	  debates	  about	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  nation,	  I	  am	  returning	  to	  this	  earlier	  error	  of	  anachronism.	  	  But	  my	  argument	  is	  not	  that	  current	  notions	  of	  the	  nation	  found	  in	  nationalism	  studies	  are	  somehow	  validated	  by	  identifying	  antecedents	  in	  Smith’s	  work.	  	  Instead	  I	  claim	  that	  the	  indeterminacy	  of	  the	  nation	  concept	  today	  reflects	  its	  origins	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  formation	  of	  modern	  nation-­‐states	  with	  chronically	  underspecified	  peoples	  as	  the	  source	  of	  their	  legitimacy	  and	  authority.	  	  Smith’s	  writings,	  from	  within	  this	  historical	  shift,	  provide	  a	  view	  into	  what	  was	  happening	  then,	  a	  view	  that	  is	  relevant	  for	  understanding	  the	  conception	  we	  have	  inherited.	  	  As	  the	  Enlightenment	  Scots	  maintained,	  to	  know	  the	  nature	  of	  something	  and	  to	  know	  its	  origins,	  are	  mutually	  implicated	  endeavours	  (Berry	  1997:	  Ch3).	  	  I	  have	  been	  exploring	  the	  modern	  discourse	  of	  nations	  by	  examining	  an	  aspect	  of	  its	  origins.	  
	  
Notes:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  i	  The	  opening	  three-­‐page	  ‘Plan	  and	  Introduction	  of	  the	  Work’	  provides	  several	  different	  instances	  of	  characteristic	  usage	  (1981:	  10-­‐12).	  ii	  I	  will,	  observe	  the	  following	  citation	  conventions.	  	  Where	  significant,	  original	  publication	  dates	  will	  be	  indicated	  at	  first	  citation.	  	  I	  will	  abbreviate	  The	  Theory	  
of	  Moral	  Sentiments	  (TMS)	  and	  The	  Wealth	  of	  Nations	  (WN).	  	  For	  text	  citations	  of	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  Smith	  I	  provide	  the	  Harvard	  reference	  followed	  by	  the	  standard	  book/chapter/paragraph	  format	  used	  in	  Smith	  scholarship.	  iii	  I	  do	  not	  use	  this	  term	  in	  the	  truncated	  sense	  sometimes	  associated	  with	  rational	  choice	  theory	  and	  economistic	  arguments,	  in	  which	  human	  action	  is	  reduced	  to	  self-­‐interested	  motivations.	  	  Instead	  I	  intend	  it	  in	  the	  way	  Weber	  used	  it.	  	  Like	  Smith,	  Weber	  regarded	  action	  as,	  by	  definition,	  socially	  oriented.	  	  But	  he	  regarded	  the	  human	  individual	  as	  the	  paradigmatic	  locus	  of	  rational	  and	  meaningful	  social	  action,	  out	  of	  which	  more	  complex	  forms	  aggregate.	  	  This	  did	  not	  commit	  him	  to	  a	  form	  of	  social	  analysis	  that	  reduces	  to	  the	  motives	  and	  actions	  of	  individuals	  (Weber	  1978:	  13-­‐14;	  cf.	  Swedberg	  2005:	  165-­‐6).	  iv	  Useful	  pointers	  to	  some	  of	  the	  relevant	  literature	  can	  be	  found	  at:	  Muller	  1993:	  247-­‐50,	  253-­‐55;	  and	  Berry	  1997:	  192-­‐3).	  	  v	  Paine	  mentions	  WN	  approvingly	  in	  The	  Rights	  of	  Man,	  Part	  I	  published	  in	  1791	  (1989:	  85),	  and	  it	  seem	  likely	  that	  he	  would	  have	  been	  familiar	  with	  TMS	  as	  well.	  vi	  I	  acknowledge	  that	  there	  are	  standing	  disagreements	  about	  how	  to	  interpret	  Smith’s	  religious	  language.	  	  Some	  have	  regarded	  his	  idea	  of	  the	  ‘invisible	  hand’	  as	  indicating	  an	  enduring	  notion	  of	  ‘providence’	  from	  the	  Protestant	  tradition	  (e.g.	  Muller	  1993:	  103-­‐110),	  while	  others	  see	  it	  more	  as	  simply	  a	  holdover	  from	  theology	  that	  makes	  little	  explanatory	  contribution	  to	  Smith’	  ideas	  (e.g.	  Berry	  1997:	  46-­‐7).	  	  I	  am	  inclined	  to	  agree	  with	  Berry.	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